Springs Times

On May 12, 2023, Congressman Lamborn's Remarks on NDIA's Hypersonics Supply Chain Report

Thank you for that kind introduction, David. Good afternoon, everyone. I’m Congressman Doug Lamborn from Colorado Springs. I’m Chairman of the House Armed Serves Strategic Forces Subcommittee and co-chair of the bipartisan Hypersonics Caucus.

It is my pleasure to speak to you on the release of the Hypersonics Supply Chain report. It was authored by Rebecca Wostenberg and others joining us here now. Through the National Defense Industrial Association’s Emerging Technologies Institute, critical issues like hypersonics are being addressed.

I was asked to provide you with the Congressional perspective on our nation’s hypersonic capabilities. It was my hope that I would be able to speak to all of you about where we stand with the fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. So much for that plan!

Here’s what I’ll say on that for: providing for the common defense of our nation is the Constitutional duty of the United States Congress. I have every confidence that the House Republican leadership will balance the NDAA among the other priorities they are managing. I expect that we will resume the NDAA process in a timely manner.

I believe that the American development of hypersonic capabilities is non-negotiable. This is a technology that was born in America but is being perfected by China and Russia. This is all because we made a bad decision 20 years ago to abandon our discovery. Now we are witnessing the consequences from the sidelines as we struggle to get into the game.

China’s technological advancements in hypersonic capabilities are the pacing challenge. Their test of a hypersonic glide vehicle with fractional orbital bombardment capabilities clearly signaled to the world that Beijing intended to take first place in the hypersonics arena. Russia, on the other hand, has developed, fielded, and used hypersonics in operations during Vladimir Putin’s unjust invasion of Ukraine. Some of Russia’s hypersonic systems are known to be nuclear-armed.

China and Russia’s advancements have proven two different operational concepts: there are both strategic and tactical uses of hypersonic capabilities. This gets to the heart of the questions that frequently arise on Capitol Hill when discussing how we should prioritize hypersonics: what is the plan? What are the strategic imperatives we are trying to achieve? Are these weapons for deterrence or standard operations – or both?

Some people would prefer to have the answer to these important, long-term questions before embarking on a full-on program of record for hypersonic capabilities. But we have wasted too much time already.

The fact is that hypersonic capabilities would provide our military with a crucial tool that will be necessary to deter or fight in a future conflict. All the advanced technology solutions that are being developed now – quantum, artificial intelligence, and directed energy, to name a few – will make the pace of a future war much faster than it is currently. These technologies will reduce decision time for senior leaders while requiring reliable capabilities for rapid response or action. The ability to use hypersonic capabilities will buy back some time in the decision cycle while providing additional options for reaching deep strike targets that currently can only be reliably reached with nuclear assets. Most importantly, they will enhance deterrence by causing an adversary to second-guess whether the United States has the capability to respond credibly or overcome any nefarious action they may be considering.

The NDIA report makes clear that without a clear strong signal from the government, industry will not be able to achieve the momentum it needs to develop the talented workforce or create the production lines that will be necessary to support the hypersonics supply chain.

The NDAA, when it does finally get passed, will make that clear. I come before you to clearly convey this message: the demand signal from Congress is here, and it’s only going to get stronger.

I will share my goal for the near-term acceleration of our hypersonic efforts. We must achieve qualitative parity with China and Russia. I am not arguing for a quantitative goal that some would call an arms race. Rather, I envision a near-term mix of capabilities that leverages advanced technology and refined production processes to achieve qualitative parity with our competitors. This is necessary not just to enhance deterrence. It will also add urgency to our ongoing research and development to drive these processes toward fielding and production at an accelerated rate.

For our first generation of hypersonic capabilities, I envision a suite of capabilities across the military services that complement, enhance, and augment our existing and planned weapon systems. For the future of warfare, I see a generational leap ahead in technology in which hypersonics, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, directed energy, and other currently nascent technologies are commonplace.

To achieve qualitative parity with China and Russia as quickly as possible, there are four areas in which I am focusing my time and efforts.

My first priority is to accelerate our development of hypersonic capabilities. We must expand testing and make it cheaper and more accessible. Testing is fundamentally a logjam that is impeding forward progress in many defense technologies, specifically hypersonics. Retired General Hyten frequently said that we should not be afraid of failure, and I believe it’s true that we learn just as much from failures as we do from successes – if not more. This is what ultimately accelerates progress. This is a cultural shift that I encourage as often as I can and that I hope the Department and industry are beginning to internalize.

Unfortunately, the current testing regime proves that this mentality has not been adopted. Deconflicting test range schedules among other programs is challenging enough. But it is made virtually impossible when considering the supporting elements that must all come together in order to monitor a test and collect relevant data. Multi-million dollar “string of pearls” tracking vessels have to be laid out in the ocean every time a hypersonics test occurs. This is enough to make some want to throw their hands up and walk away from the endeavor entirely.

While I am frustrated, as are many of you, by the immense challenges posed by testing, I am encouraged by recent progress. Over the past two years, Congress has consistently added funding for expanded testing capabilities. This includes an initiative I led in last year’s NDAA specifically geared to get after this issue: the National Hypersonics Initiative. I am encouraged by the progress the Department is making on the Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonics Test Bed, or MACH-TB, which seeks to perform early tests on hypersonic capabilities. This includes the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon that is set to field later this year and will be America’s first operational hypersonic capability.

I believe there is still a lot of room for improvement in testing. I am hopeful that the Department can continue to build on existing progress in the MACH-TB program and related initiatives. I hope DOD will continue to work with all stakeholders on solutions to address this challenge in small and large ways. We will see more progress on this in the fiscal year 2024 NDAA.

Second, we must continue to invest in various capability options at this stage in our development. I am not concerned that each of the military services and even parts of the Office of the Secretary are working on their own similar, but different hypersonic capabilities. I am concerned that we may give up on a concept too early and hone in on one solution before fully understanding the options and implications of all of them. There are inherent connections in the programs at this stage: the Army’s fielding of L-R-H-W this year will inform the Navy’s plan to field Conventional Prompt Strike aboard DDG-1000’s in 2025, which will inform the Navy’s follow-on plan to field C-P-S on Virginia submarines in 2028. By exploring two technologies with ARRW and HAC-M, the Air Force is charting the way in developing options for land-, air-, and sea-based concepts of hypersonic capabilities. There is discussion now over ARRW specifically, which I would like to see continue in some form so that we leverage the technology investments we have made, even if this program moves in another direction.

Third, we must reduce barriers to collaboration to foster accelerated development. The United States must do more to work with allies and partners to co-develop hypersonic technology and leverage each other’s expertise to achieve faster breakthroughs to our mutual benefit. There is ample opportunity to expand these partnerships to others in our network of international allies and partners. There are plentiful opportunities for the Department to work with commercial companies right here on our soil. However, as many of you know, it is not always easy to do business with the Department of Defense.

To address this, one of my top priorities for this Congress has been to demand that the Department seriously address its overclassification tendencies. My emphasis in this area has mainly focused on the space domain, which I think is the most rampant example. If taken seriously by the Department, it would have positive implications for hypersonics development as well. The Department’s inclination to mislabel or overclassify information is more than just an annoyance to certain members of Congress who don’t have ready access to classified systems.

It fundamentally inhibits progress on technology when even trusted industry partners are challenged to fully understand the scope and intent of the Department. And this is not to mention other industry, international, or commercial partners for whom classification restrictions are an insurmountable barrier to entry. Furthermore, it fundamentally undermines robust public discussion on the efficient use of taxpayer dollars and understanding of the strategic and policy intent of our military. Even within Congress it can be difficult to fully convey the extent of the threat to colleagues. Addressing this issue and re-classifying information, when appropriate, is critical to fostering forward progress.

Finally, we must encourage hypersonic offensive and defensive capability development to occur in tandem and to leverage each other’s work. The H-B-T-S-S satellites that are going up this year will be able to detect, track, engage, and provide the fire control necessary to destroy hypersonic threats. This capability will ultimately be carried out by the Glide Phase Interceptor. As those capabilities are developed and fielded, they should seek to partner with offensive research, development, and testing to inform their target set and even assist in relieving some of the tracking burdens that exist in our current testing infrastructure. This is another area in which industry can lead the way in developing the next generation of hypersonic capabilities. This can be done as we work on the targets and technology to inform defensive requirements that could be leveraged to develop offensive ones.

I am honored to have the opportunity to lead these important efforts in Congress as Chairman of Strategic Forces and Co-Chair of the Hypersonics Caucus. With these four efforts – expanding testing, investing in technology solutions, addressing overclassification, and expanding multiple defense capability developments – I believe we can get ourselves onto a path toward qualitative parity with China and Russia in hypersonics.

Thank you all for being here to learn more about the specific challenges facing the hypersonics supply chain that NDIA has identified. It is essential we overcome these challenges to achieve success in our hypersonics efforts. It has been a pleasure to speak to you, and I hope you enjoy the rest of the discussion

Original source can be found here.