Springs Times

Washington, D.C. - On April 28, 2023, Congressman Lamborn, Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, delivered the following remarks to Hudson Institute and the Advanced Nuclear Weapons Alliance on the status of America’s deterrence posture:

Thank you, Peter, for the invitation to attend today. It’s great to see so many friendly faces in the room, and I know there are many more watching virtually as we live stream this event. Thank you to the Hudson Institute and the Advanced Nuclear Weapons Alliance for making this happen.

 I am honored every day to represent the servicemembers, their families, and the community that supports them in Colorado Springs. My district is home to five military installations and two combatant commands. Strategic Forces issues are the bread and butter of my community, and the military operations in my district are among the most consequential in our military.

Ever since Putin’s unjustified and unwarranted invasion of Ukraine over a year ago, there has been a robust and overdue discussion about deterrence. Debates over whether this horrible act constituted a failure of deterrence have been ongoing in strategic forces circles. I’m sure many of you have been a part of one or two. While these conversations are vital to understanding this conflict and the role of the United States in supporting Ukraine, I think that the fundamental issue at hand is different. With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that of course we could and even should have done more to prepare and arm Ukraine to prevent Putin and his cronies from even thinking that an invasion attempt would succeed.

However, the success or failure of deterrence does not ride on a single moment or action. Maintaining deterrence is a never-ending endeavor that requires persistence, commitment, and willingness to take action. The failure of deterrence in the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did not come from the act of commission or omission itself, but rather from the incremental decisions made before and after the conflict began.

When we saw Russian troops and equipment massing around the Ukrainian border, including in Belarus, we questioned Russia’s willingness to act. We failed to take every action possible to adequately posture Ukraine to deter it. After Russia began its unjust war on the Ukrainian people, the United States seemed reluctant to act. Every time President Zelenskyy asked for a specific capability or training, it was Congress that pushed the Administration to take action. Throughout the conflict, we have not demonstrated a clear interest in giving the Ukrainians everything they need to win - instead, we have given them only what they need not to lose. This is why deterrence failed. Deterrence is the responsibility of each individual country, and Ukraine has taken responsibility for its own defense. However, since the U.S. has committed to assisting Ukraine, it’s worth reflecting on our approach to understanding real-world deterrence dynamics.

We have to learn this lesson to understand why we are now witnessing the first land war in Europe since World War II. Deterrence did not fail because Russia invaded Ukraine - it failed because we lacked the credibility and will to stand up against it. This is the challenge facing our strategic forces today.

No one in this audience will be surprised to hear what I’m about to say. Our position is precarious. Our nuclear triad is currently undergoing a complete overhaul modernization that is challenged by aggressive schedules and plagued by supply chain and workforce shortfalls. Our missile defenses are outdated and unsuited to defeat modern threats. Our self-inflicted delay in developing hypersonic capabilities has put us in a no-fail situation to develop and field these capabilities rapidly. And in space, the one area where we have an advantage, we are struggling to stay ahead.

Our adversaries have taken note of our position. China is engaged in a nuclear breakout that retired Admiral Richard described as breathtaking, Beijing refuses to come to the negotiating table for arms control or strategic stability discussions. Russia, meanwhile, now has broken every single treaty it has entered into. Both are ahead of us in hypersonic capabilities and are racing to overtake us in space. They are doing this to undermine our ability to deter them, while enhancing their ability to coerce us, our allies, and our international partners.

The capabilities we have today are insufficient to deter where China and Russia are racing to be. As Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I see it as my responsibility to ensure the United States has the capabilities it needs to bolster a compelling deterrence posture now and in the future. We cannot afford complacency.

My first priority is to accelerate the pace of our hypersonics development - both offensive and defensive. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are all working on their first-generation hypersonic capabilities, and while some programs are having more success than others, I believe they are all valuable. I want to see this development and fielding happen much faster so that we can advance this technology into the next generation, moving away from the silver bullet concept and into a more distributed and usable concept of operations. Simultaneously we have to rapidly develop and field our defensive capability - which to me means prioritizing the H-B-T-S-S and Glide Phase Interceptor programs and pull both to the left wherever possible. None of this can be done without robust and expanded testing capacity, which is something I am working very closely on in this year’s NDAA.

My second priority is to address China’s nuclear breakout. This means full modernization of our nuclear triad with the Columbia, Sentinel, and Raider programs and their associated missiles and warheads. Given the expanding threats we face, it is also apparent to me that now is not the time to talk about cutting capabilities. Until a replacement capability is identified, we must retain the B83 gravity bomb. And it is essential that we complete research and development of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, or SLCM-N, and move that capacity into production and fielding. To do all of this, we will need to robustly invest in NNSA, specifically to reconstitute our plutonium pit production capability. And finally, we should consider whether we need to keep these production lines running beyond currently scheduled quantities to deter China and Russia, and consider whether new capabilities may be needed down the line.

Third, in order to strengthen deterrence, we need to finally get serious about homeland missile defense. A vulnerable homeland invites misguided thoughts of threats or coercion, while a robustly defended homeland allows us to project strength where and when needed. As the Biden Administration’s Missile Defense Review points out, this includes defending Guam. We need a robust and layered homeland missile defense architecture, including a full sensor and radar layer for early warning. This will leverage ground and space-based assets networked together for a full picture. I also believe that construction of a third missile defense site on the East Coast, as has been planned for years, should finally get underway.

Fourth and finally, I highly prioritize our efforts to organize to work in space as a war-fighting domain. I think we are largely on the right track as the Space Force continues to build out, but there are two areas I am focused on to ensure we are building the foundations right from the start. First, I am pushing the Department to seriously review its overclassification of space programs and re-classify where possible to facilitate more robust public discussion and collaboration with our allies, international partners, and industry stakeholders. Second, I am taking a hard look at the acquisition structures and procedures that are forming to ensure that these efforts remain streamlined and efficient and do not fall into the trap of business as usual, which, as we know, is often way too slow in the DOD.

There is a lot of work to be done, but I know all of these initiatives I laid out are critical to preventing the kind of day we hope will never come. The best way to avert a crisis is to be prepared for one. I am committed to ensuring we have the capabilities we need to credibly deter whatever threats come our way.

With that, I’ll turn it back over to you, Peter. Thank you all for listening to me today, and I look forward to your questions.

Original source can be found here.